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Abstract. A unionised monopoly firm, benefitting from some kind of anti-
competitive regulation, and its corresponding trade union have a common interest
in spending resources to protect the monopoly rents created by the regulation. In
the present paper, a situation in which the unionised monopoly is challenged by a
consumer organisation fighting for deregulation is analysed as a standard Tullock
rent-seeking contest. With unequal sharing of monopoly rents, the free-riding
incentives among the rent-defending players turn out to be overwhelming, in the
sense that the unique Nash equilibrium is characterised by zero effort contribution
by the player with the lower valuation of the contested prize. This implies that
being “strong”, in terms of bargaining strength, is not necessarily an advantage
for neither player in a unionised monopoly that is threatened by deregulation.
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1. Introduction
Rent-seeking effort undertaken by firms in order to obtain, or protect, favourable
market positions has long been regarded as an integral part of a modern
economy.1 The literature on rent-seeking activities by firms, which was pioneered
by Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975), highlights the important
insight that the social costs of monopolies created by restrictive regulations are
likely to be higher than the “standard” deadweight loss.
 I am indebted to Kai A. Konrad, Steinar Vagstad, Kjell Erik Lommerud, seminar participants at
the University of Bergen, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
1 See Nitzan (1994) for a survey of the theory of rent-seeking.
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In an important paper, Ellingsen (1991) broadens the scope of traditional rent-
seeking theory by including rent-seeking expenditures by consumers. Indeed, he
shows that consumer lobbying against potential and existing monopolies is very
likely to be socially beneficial. Other papers analysing consumer participation in
rent-seeking contests include Fabella (1993, 1995) and Rama (1997).
In a more general setting, though, it is also natural to include trade unions
as independent players in rent-seeking games. Empirically, it is reasonably well
documented that imperfect competition in product markets is a major source of
rent extraction by unionised labour (see e.g. Rose, 1987; Christophides and Os-
wald, 1992). Thus, it could be very much in the interest of trade unions to engage
in lobbying, or other kinds of actions, directed against regulatory authorities in
order to create or preserve various types of market regulations. These kinds of
actions are also frequently observed in most industrialised countries. With very
few exceptions, though, rent-seeking expenditure by organised labour has not
received much attention in the literature.
Following Ellingsen (1991), we can distinguish between two different types
of rent-seeking: Rent-seeking by potential producers for a monopoly position,
and rent-seeking by an existing monopolist to defend his monopoly position.
The effect of unionised labour in rent-seeking contests of the former kind is
extensively analysed by Rama (1997),2 the main results being that the presence
of trade unions makes monopolisation less attractive to firms, and more harmful
to consumers. Thus, rent-seeking expenditures by firms are reduced, and the
probability of regulation is reduced, compared to the non-union case.
In this paper we concentrate on the latter type of rent-seeking contests. As
observed by Ellingsen (1991), in most cases consumers launch their campaigns
against existing monopolies. Furthermore, trade unions that are already favoured
by existing regulations are probably more likely to play an active part in rent-
seeking contests.
Our focus is directed towards an existing unionised monopoly that is favoured
by some kind of anti-competitive regulation, e.g. protection from international
competition. Applying the lottery model of Tullock (1980) we then analyse a
rent-seeking contest between the rent-defending players, i.e. the protected firm
and its trade union, and an organisation representing consumers’ interests. This
is a contest between a group of agents (the firm and the union) on one side,
and an individual agent (the consumer group) on the other. In this respect it is a
special application of a more general group rent-seeking contest (see e.g. Katz,
Nitzan and Rosenberg, 1990; Nitzan, 1991; Lee, 1995).
An important feature of this particular contest is the prevalence of free-riding
incentives within the rent-defending group. If the rent-defending players win the
contest, and regulation is upheld, the “prize” is shared between the firm and the
union on the basis of relative bargaining strength in wage negotiations. However,
these prize-sharing “rules” are exogenous to the contest itself, and thus, both rent-
defending players have strong incentives to free-ride in the contest by leaving
2 Contrary to the present paper, Rama (1997) does not consider trade unions as independent contest
participants.
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the burden of defending the monopoly to the other player. Indeed, we find that
the nature of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is crucially dependent upon
the rent-defending players’ relative valuation of the contested prize. If valuations
are unequal, i.e. if monopoly rents are unequally distributed between the firm
and the union, the unique Nash equilibrium is characterised by zero contribution
of lobbying effort by the player with the lower valuation. If valuations are equal,
there is a continuum of equilibria, each in which total rent-defending effort is
the same, but relative effort contributions by the firm and the union differs.
The characteristics of the Nash equilibrium, in terms of free-riding, yield
some interesting implications with regard to relative bargaining strength. Being
“strong” is not necessarily an advantage, for neither the union nor the firm, in a
unionised monopoly that is threatened by deregulation. If, say, the union has a
relatively low degree of bargaining strength, the workers’ share of the monopoly
rents is relatively low. This could, however, be more than outweighed, in terms
of expected net payoff, by the ability to free-ride on the firm’s rent-defending
expenditures in the contest.
Having established the Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative rent-seeking
contest, a major part of the paper is devoted to analysing the implications of
unionisation with respect to total rent-seeking and social welfare in this particular
setting, where the non-union benchmark corresponds to Ellingsen (1991). The
presence of a trade union affects the incentives for lobbying expenditures for all
contestants, with subsequent implications for total rent-seeking and welfare. An
important result is that the presence of a trade union increases the probability of
deregulation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 the basic assumptions
of the non-cooperative rent-seeking contest is presented, and the Nash equilib-
rium is derived. In Sect. 3 the nature of this equilibrium is analysed within the
context of a general right-to-manage model, where the sharing of monopoly rents
is implicitly determined through wage bargaining. In Sect. 4 we consider the pos-
sibility of rent-defending cooperation between the firm and the union. Section 5
offers some concluding remarks.
2. A Tullock rent-seeking contest
Consider a regulated unionised monopoly that comes under pressure from a
consumer organisation that is fighting for deregulation. The type of regulation
could typically be protection from international competition. This is a case in
which both the monopolised firm and its trade union have a common interest in
preserving the protective regulation.
We assume that whether or not regulation is upheld is dependent on the
amount of lobbying activity exercised by the players towards the regulatory
authorities. The exact specification of the rules of the contest is that of a Tullock
(1980) game, where the outcome of the contest is the assignment to each player
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of a probability that he wins the prize.3 The probability of winning the contest is
determined by relative rent-seeking effort. Using a standard Tullock probability
function,4 the probability that regulation is preserved, µ, is given by
µ =
x + z
x + z + y
(1)
where x and z are effort contributions by the firm and the union, respectively,
whereas y is the effort of the consumers’ association. With this particular contest
success function we assume that effort contribution by either of the rent-defending
players is equally effective.
A special characteristic of this particular contest is that the players have dif-
ferent valuations of the contested prize. The monopoly firm and its trade union are
both defending the opportunity to extract some monopoly rents from the market.
If regulation is upheld, these rents are shared between the rent-defending players
according to their relative bargaining strength. We denote monopoly profits by
t , whereas union rents are denoted by r .
The consumers, on the other hand, are fighting for a competitive price level
in the market. If the consumer organisation wins the contest, and the monopoly
is deregulated, its valuation is given by the full monopoly rents (t +r), in addition
to the efficiency loss from monopolisation, denoted by h .5
Assuming risk-neutrality, expected net payoff for the firm and the union,
respectively, are given by
E
(
πf
)
= µt − x (2)
E (πu ) = µr − z (3)
whereas expected net payoff for the consumer group is given by
E (πc) = (1 − µ) (t + r + h) − y (4)
3 This is an imperfectly discriminatory contest, in which the highest bid does not win with cer-
tainty. Compared to the other standard alternative from the rent-seeking literature (the perfectly
discriminatory contest), we believe the Tullock lottery model to be a more realistic description of
the impact of lobbying expenditures on political decisions.
4 Tullock (1980) proposes a contest success function of a more general form, where an agent’s
chance of success in a contest is given by
pi (xi ) =
xai∑n
j =1 x
a
j
(see Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatisation). However, since there are asymmetric valuations of
the contested prize in our model, we choose a = 1 for greater analytical tractability. Regarding the
generality of this specification, the properties of the Nash equilibrium (reported in Proposition 1) are
qualitatively dependent on a being sufficiently large.
5 Here we make two implicit assumptions. Firstly, we assume that deregulation yields a competitive
market price. Secondly, we assume, as Ellingsen (1991) does, that all consumers are organised.
Rama (1997) makes the, perhaps more realistic, assumption that a single consumer association is
representing a fraction c ∈ [0, 1] of the consumers. For simplicity, we follow Ellingsen and set
c = 1.
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2.1. Equilibrium
The solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium. Each player chooses his level
of effort by maximising expected net payoff. For simplicity, we assume that the
players are not wealth constrained. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium out-
come is given by the solution to the players’ simultaneous concave programming
problems, given by the following:
max
x
µt − x s.t . x ≥ 0
max
z
µr − z s.t . z ≥ 0 (5)
max
y
(1 − µ) (t + r + h) − y s.t . y ≥ 0
From the solution to this problem, the following proposition is derived:
Proposition 1 (i) If t /= r there is a unique equilibrium, characterised by zero
effort contribution from the rent-defending player with the lower valuation of the
prize. (ii) If t = r there is a continuum of equilibria, each in which the sum of
rent-defending effort is constant, but the division of effort between the firm and
the trade union differs.
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
If the firm and the union value the right to extract monopoly rents differently,
Proposition 1 proves the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in which the
rent-defending player with the higher valuation contributes all the contest effort,
whereas the other player is a free rider. Thus, there are both benefits and costs,
in terms of net expected payoff, by being the player that captures the larger share
of the rents.
This result is clearly related to the large literature on private provision of pub-
lic goods, which was pioneered by Olson (1965). In our setting, rent-defending
effort can be viewed as a local public good that is provided by voluntary con-
tributions from the firm and the trade union. The phenomenon of free-riding in-
centives in public good provision of this kind has been extensively analysed (see
e.g. McGuire, 1974; Chamberlin, 1976; Cornes and Sandler, 1985). However,
most of the analysis have used the assumption of identical individual preferences
for the public good. A notable exception is Bergstrom et al. (1986), who point
out that even very small changes in preferences can lead to a large change in
the structure of the equilibrium, with respect to free-riding. In a specific example
with quasilinear utility, they find that the agent with the strongest preference for
the public good makes all the contribution, while the other agents are free rid-
ers. This is a result similar to Proposition 1, considering that the rent-defending
players’ valuation of the prize is a measure of their preferences for lobbying
effort.
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3. Union-firm bargaining
Rent-sharing is assumed to be determined through bargaining between the firm
and the union. The literature is dominated by two classes of trade union models,6
which are commonly referred to as right-to-manage (with the monopoly union
model as a special case) and efficient bargaining. In right-to-manage models,
the union and the firm bargain over the wage level, whereas employment is
unilaterally set by the firm. Efficient bargaining, on the other hand, depicts the
case in which both wages and employment are subject to bargaining. In any case,
rent-sharing between the rent-defending players are determined by a number of
factors (e.g. relative bargaining strength, the mode of bargaining, product market
conditions) that are exogenous to the contest itself.
In the following analysis we will apply a standard right-to-manage model
in which monopoly rents are implicitly shared between the union and the firm
through wage bargaining. This approach corresponds well with the observation
that most collective bargaining contracts seem to leave firms with full discretion
over the level of employment.
The outcome of wage bargaining is determined by the relative bargaining
strength of the negotiating players. Let α ∈ (0, 1) denote the relative bargaining
strength of the trade union. We then make the assumption that the size of α
uniquely determines the equilibrium levels of profits, union rents and consumers’
surplus, and further, that t , r and h can be defined as continuous, differentiable
functions of α.
Without making any specific assumptions about product market demand, ex-
cept that the demand curve is downward sloping, or the bargaining game itself,
we can make the following general assumptions about r (·), t (·) and h (·):
r (0) = 0, t (1) > 0 (6)
r ′ (α) > 0, t ′ (α) < 0, h ′ (α) > 0 (7)
r ′ (α) + t ′ (α) < 0, r ′ (α) + t ′ (α) + h ′ (α) > 0 (8)
Additionally, we assume that t (1) < r (1), implying the existence of a value
α̂ < 1, so that
r (α̂) = t (α̂)
These assumptions incorporate the features of the right-to-manage model. The
presence of a trade union implies an additional inefficiency in rent extraction. If
the union is able to increase wages through bargaining, the firm will optimally
respond by passing some of the cost increase on to consumers in the form of a
higher product price. Thus, increased union strength in wage bargaining implies
that the efficiency loss increases, while consumers’ surplus is reduced.
6 See Oswald (1985) for an overview.
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As stated in Proposition 1, the Nash equilibrium of the rent-seeking contest
is characterised by a “switching” property, resulting in zero effort contribution
from the rent-defending player with the lower valuation of the prize. We are now
in a position to explore the implications of this property in the context of relative
bargaining strength.
For notational convenience we define the consumers’ valuation of the con-
tested prize as
s (α) = t (α) + r (α) + h (α) (9)
Inserting the equilibrium levels of contest effort into (1), (2) and (3), we find
expected net payoff for the firm and the union to be given by7
E
[
π∗f (α)
]
=


t (α)3
[s (α) + t (α)]2 if α < α̂
r (α) t (α)
[s (α) + r (α)] if α > α̂
(10)
E
[
π∗u (α)
]
=


r (α) t (α)
[s (α) + t (α)] if α < α̂
r (α)3
[s (α) + r (α)]2 if α > α̂
(11)
Proposition 2 ∃δ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any α′ ∈ (α̂− δ, α̂) and α′′ ∈ (α̂, α̂ + δ),
E
[
π∗f
(
α′
)]
< E
[
π∗f
(
α′′
)]
and E
[
π∗u
(
α′
)]
> E
[
π∗u
(
α′′
)]
.
Proof. Due to continuity of r (·) and t (·) it is sufficient to show that
lim
α→α̂+
E
[
π∗f (α)
]
> lim
α→α̂−
E
[
π∗f (α)
]
and
lim
α→α̂+
E
[
π∗u (α)
]
< lim
α→α̂−
E
[
π∗u (α)
]
.
Using (10) and (11) we find that both conditions are satisfied if
[
t
(
α̂
)]2[
s
(
α̂
)
+t
(
α̂
)] >[
t
(
α̂
)]3[
s
(
α̂
)
+t
(
α̂
)]2 . A simple rearrangement reduces this condition to
[
t (α̂)]2 s (α̂) [s (α̂) + t (α̂)] > 0 ,
which is unambiguously true. unionsq
7 For space-saving purposes, equilibrium values for α = α̂ are dropped from the mathematical
expressions throughout the paper. This simplification does not influence the analysis in any way.
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Proposition 2 implies that it is not necessarily an advantage, for neither player,
to have a high degree of bargaining strength in a unionised monopoly that is
threatened by deregulation. Put differently, it is possible to be “too strong” in
this setting. This result illustrates the conflict between ex ante and ex post in-
terests for the rent-defending players. Ex ante, being able to free-ride in the
rent-seeking contest is the privilege of the weaker player, whereas ex post, being
the weaker player is obviously a disadvantage in wage bargaining. Thus, since
the rent-defending players’ ex post payoffs are monotonic in α, there exists a
neighbourhood of α̂ in which both the union and the firm ex ante would prefer
to be the weaker player, because the rent-defending outlays more than outweigh
the benefits of gaining a larger share of the rents if regulation is preserved.
To offer a further characterisation of δ, which could potentially be large,
some additional assumptions about the bargaining game and the product demand
function are necessary. Applying the generalised Nash bargaining model with
linear demand, the result in Proposition 2 is illustrated in Fig. 1.8
Fig. 1. Net expected payoff for the firm (thick curve) and the union (thin curve) with linear demand
With this particular specification of the model, the “switching point” is given
by α̂ = 23 . An interesting observation is the non-monotonicity of the trade union’s
ex ante payoff for α < α̂. Even when the union is free-riding in the contest,
expected net payoff for the union is decreasing in its own relative bargaining
strength when α approaches α̂. This is caused by rapidly decreasing incentives
for the firm to contribute contest effort, which results in a reduced win probability
for the rent-defending players, and this is not fully compensated for, in terms of
expected union utility, by a larger share of the rents if the contest is won.
For the remainder of this section, the analysis will concentrate on the impact
of unionisation on rent-seeking and social welfare. In the general model, α = 0
represents the non-union case, whereas α > 0 represents the case of a unionised
monopoly.
8 See Appendix B for an explicit derivation of the equilibrium.
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3.1. Rent-seeking
The equilibrium levels of rent-seeking effort for the contestants are given by
x∗ (α) =


[t (α)]2 s (α)
[s (α) + t (α)]2 if α < α̂
0 if α > α̂
(12)
z ∗ (α) =


0 if α < α̂
[r (α)]2 s (α)
[s (α) + r (α)]2 if α > α̂
(13)
y∗ (α) =


[s (α)]2 t (α)
[s (α) + t (α)]2 if α < α̂
[s (α)]2 r (α)
[s (α) + r (α)]2 if α > α̂
(14)
Summing over individual contributions, we get the total rent-seeking outlays
in equilibrium, TR∗:
TR∗ (α) =


s (α) t (α)
s (α) + t (α) if α < α̂
s (α) r (α)
s (α) + r (α) if α > α̂
(15)
By comparing the equilibrium values for α = 0 and α > 0, we are able to
establish the effect of unionisation on rent-seeking expenditures.
Proposition 3 Unionisation implies that (i) less rent-seeking effort is exerted to
defend the monopoly, and (ii) total rent-seeking effort is also reduced, unless the
reduction of consumers’ surplus is large relative to the reduction of monopoly
rents for the active rent-defending contestant.
Proof. (i) To simplify notation, let t (α) = t and t (0) = t , with similar notation
for the other variables. Consider the case of α < α̂. Using (12), and the def-
inition of s , we find, through some tedious rearranging, that x∗ (0) > x∗ (α) if(
t3h2 − t2 (t + r) h2
)
+ hh
(
ht2 − ht2
)
+ rst2 (2h + r) + 4t tss (t − t) > 0. Since
t > (t + r) and h > h , this is unambiguously true. For α > α̂ we can exploit the
symmetric nature of the equilibrium. Replacing t with r in the above inequality
yields the condition for x∗ (0) > z∗ (α), which is also unambiguously true.
(ii) Using (15) we find that, for α < α̂, TR∗ (0) > TR∗ (α) if ss (t − t) +
t t (s − s) > 0. For α > α̂, we find that TR∗ (0) > TR∗ (α) if ss (t − r) +
tr (s − s) > 0. We see that both conditions hold unless |s − s|, which is a
measure of the reduction in consumers’ surplus, is large relative to the reduction
of rents,
(
t − t) or (t − r), for the active rent-defending contestant. unionsq
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The first part of Proposition 3 is intuitively straightforward. The presence of a
trade union means that the active rent-defending contestant has a lower valuation
of the prize. Consequently, the incentives for spending resources to defend the
monopoly are unambiguously reduced.
In contrast, the presence of a union implies that consumers are facing two
opposite incentives for effort contribution in the contest. On the one hand, a
lower level of effort by the rent-defending player allows the consumer group
also to reduce its effort. On the other hand, the extra inefficiency caused by the
trade union increases the consumers’ valuation of the contested prize, implying a
higher incentive to exert effort. The relative magnitude of these two incentives is
determined by the relative change in valuations for the contestants, compared with
the non-union case. If the reduction of consumers’ surplus, which is equivalent
to the increase in valuation for the consumers, is large relative to the reduction
in valuation for the active rent-defending contestant, the second incentive is
dominating, and the consumer group will spend more resources on rent-seeking.
If this effect is sufficiently strong, the incentives for the consumers to increase
rent-seeking effort could possibly outweigh the reduction in contest effort for the
rent-defending player, causing total rent-seeking to increase.
The actual size of the relative change in valuations depends of course on
the characteristics of the product demand function. We can, however, make two
different observations about the relationship between total rent-seeking outlays
and relative bargaining strength. For α > α̂, total rent-seeking is always increas-
ing in the union’s relative bargaining strength.9 This result is intuitively easy to
explain. Since the union is the active rent-defending contestant for α > α̂, it
follows that both contestants’ valuation of the prize is increasing in α. Thus, a
higher value of α within this regime means that both the union and the consumer
group have an incentive to spend more resources on rent-seeking. For α < α̂, on
the other hand, it will generally be the case that a sufficient degree of convexity
in demand is required for total rent-seeking to increase in the union’s relative
bargaining strength.10
The effects of unionisation and relative bargaining strength on total rent-
seeking is illustrated in Fig. 2 for the case of linear demand. For this specific
case we see that the presence of a trade union always reduces total rent-seeking.
9 From (15) it is easily confirmed that ∂TR
∂α
> 0 for α > α̂.
10 The extent to which the reduction in consumers’ surplus is large relative to the reduction in firm
profits as α increases, depends on to which extent the firm is able to shift an increase in wages on to
the consumers in the form of a higher product price. Let product demand be given by the function
D (p), and consider the following standard monopoly problem:
max
p
π = (p − w) D (p)
Differentiating the first order condition of this problem with respect to w yields
dp
dw
=
D ′ (p)
2D ′ (p) + (p − w) D ′′ (p)
We see that the increase in the product price as a response to a marginal increase in wages is higher
the more convex is D (p).
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Fig. 2. Rent-defending outlays (thin curve) and total rent-seeking (thick curve) with linear demand
3.2. Probability of deregulation
Since unionisation affects rent-seeking incentives, the probability of deregulation
will also be affected. Inserting the equilibrium rent-seeking expenditures, (12)–
(14), into (1), the equilibrium probability that regulation is preserved is found to
be:
µ∗ (α) =


t (α)
s (α) + t (α) if α < α̂
r (α)
s (α) + r (α) if α > α̂
(16)
From (16) the following proposition is established:
Proposition 4 Unionisation implies that the probability of deregulation increases.
Proof. For α < α̂, µ∗ (0) > µ∗ (α) if t(0)
s(0)+t(0) >
t(α)
s(α)+t(α) . This condition reduces
to t (0) s (α) > t (α) s (0). For α > α̂, µ∗ (0) > µ∗ (α) if t(0)
s(0)+t(0) >
r(α)
s(α)+r(α) . This
condition reduces to t (0) s (α) > r (α) s (0). Since t (0) > t (α), t (0) > r (α) and
s (α) > s (0), both conditions hold unambiguously. unionsq
The intuition of this result is fairly straightforward. The presence of a trade
union implies that the consumer lobby puts a relatively higher value on the
contested prize than do the active rent-defending player. This will shift the in-
centives for rent-seeking, so that a larger share of total rent-seeking is carried
out by consumers. Consequently, the probability of deregulation will increase.
3.3. Welfare
Standard models of trade unions tend to emphasise the efficiency loss caused
by unionisation. Taking rent-seeking incentives into consideration, the welfare
effects of unionisation might not be so clear-cut, though. An appropriate measure
of social welfare in this context must somehow incorporate the fact that the
presence of a trade union will affect the probability of deregulation.
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It seems natural to use the sum of expected payoffs for the different players
as a (partial) measure of expected social welfare. We let consumers’ surplus in
the monopoly case be denoted by CS (α). Denoting consumers’ surplus in the
case of a competitive market by CS , we have that expected welfare is given by
E [W (α)] = µ (α) [CS (α) + t (α) + r (α)] + [1 − µ (α)] CS − TR (α)
where
CS = CS (α) + t (α) + r (α) + h (α)
A simple rearrangement yields
E [W (α)] = CS (α) + [t (α) + r (α)] + [1 − µ (α)] h (α) − TR (α) (17)
The “standard” measure of social welfare is given by the first two terms on the
right hand side, which denote consumers’ surplus and total monopoly rents, re-
spectively. Due to the inefficiency in rent extraction caused by the trade union,
both these terms are decreasing in α. The third term captures how the pres-
ence of a trade union affects the probability of deregulation. With probability
(1 − µ) the monopoly is deregulated, and social welfare is increased by h . Since
µ is decreasing in α, whereas h is increasing in the union’s relative bargaining
strength, we see that unionisation has a positive effect on expected social welfare
in this respect. Although the presence of a union creates an extra inefficiency
by inducing a higher product price, it also affects rent-seeking incentives in a
way that increases the probability of deregulation. The inclusion of the last term
in the welfare function implies that rent-seeking as such is perceived as socially
wasteful. From Proposition 3 we know that the effect of unionisation on total
rent-seeking is ambiguous, but most likely negative.
Not surprisingly, given the above analysis, the total effect of unionisation on
social welfare is dependent on the characteristics of product demand, and thus
ambiguous. Using the assumption of linear demand, though, we find that the
presence of a trade union always leads to an increase in expected social welfare
in this setting.
4. Cooperative rent-defending
Due to the problem of free-riding in the non-cooperative contest, it would perhaps
be natural to assume that the rent-defending players could do better by forming
a cooperative agreement. Let us assume that the total amount of rent-defending
effort is jointly determined by the firm and its trade union. In this case the
pro-regulation coalition maximises
E
(
πf + πu
)
= µ (t + r) − xc (18)
where xc is the joint amount of rent-defending outlays. As before, the consumer
group chooses the level of contest effort that maximises (4).
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Solving these two optimisation problems, we find the equilibrium rent-seeking
outlays in the cooperative version of the model to be
x c (α) = [s (α) − h (α)]
2 s (α)
[2s (α) − h (α)]2 (19)
yc (α) = [s (α)]
2 [s (α) − h (α)]
[2s (α) − h (α)]2 (20)
Under rent-defending cooperation, the efficiency loss, h , is a measure of the
asymmetry between the contestants’ valuation of the prize. From (19) and (20)
it is easily verified that the higher is h , the larger share of total rent-seeking is
undertaken by the consumers.
Inserting (19)-(20) into (18), we find expected total payoff to the rent-
defending coalition to be given by
E
(
πf + πu
)
=
[s (α) − h (α)]3
[2s (α) − h (α)]2 (21)
Proposition 5 Cooperation between the rent-defending players is not jointly prof-
itable if (i) the efficiency loss is sufficiently high, or (ii) the union’s relative bar-
gaining strength is sufficiently low.
Proof. Cooperation is not jointly profitable if E (πf + πu) < E (π∗f ) + E (π∗u ).
Using (10), (11) and (21) we find that this condition reduces to
h [t (2t + h) + r (t − r)] − r (t + r)2 > 0 if α < α̂ (22)
and
h [r (2r + h) + t (r − t)] − t (t + r)2 > 0 if α > α̂ (23)
Since the first term in both (22) and (23) is positive, we see that both conditions
hold if h is sufficiently high. Furthermore, since r (0) = 0 we see that condition
(23) holds unambiguously if α = 0. Due to continuity of r (·) the condition must
also hold for some small values of α. unionsq
Whether or not it is jointly profitable for the rent-defending players to coor-
dinate their actions in the lobbying game, is crucially dependent on the strategic
response from the opponent. If the increase in lobbying effort from the consumers
more than outweigh the benefit of internalising the free-rider effect, the firm and
the union are jointly worse off by cooperating in the contest. Proposition 5 in-
dicates that this result is most likely to appear if the players’ relative bargaining
strengths are sufficiently unequal.
This result is highly related to the well-known analysis of strategic behaviour
in contests by Dixit (1987). He shows that in a contest of this kind, with asymmet-
ric valuations of the prize, the player with the lower valuation (the “underdog”)
has an incentive to pre-commit to a lower level of contest effort.
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In this particular setting the rent-defending coalition is the “underdog”. Thus,
free-riding may actually be beneficial for the coalition as a whole, since total
rent-defending outlays are reduced, compared to the cooperative alternative.
Whether or not cooperation is jointly profitable depends on the equilibrium
level of rent-defending lobbying in the non-cooperative game compared to the
Stackelberg level of lobbying. The optimal level of effort reduction if the coalition
was able to act as a Stackelberg leader is dependent on the degree of asymmetry in
the contest. If the degree of asymmetry is sufficiently high, i.e. if h is sufficiently
high, the effort level in the free-riding equilibrium is either above or sufficiently
close to the Stackelberg level of effort, making the cooperative alternative jointly
unprofitable.11
Considering the second part of Proposition 5, the relative reduction of effort
obtained by not cooperating, is determined by the difference between (t + r)
and the valuation by the active rent-defending contestant in the non-cooperative
equilibrium. If α is small, then r is small and (t + r) is close to t , which is the
firm’s valuation of the prize. Thus, if α is close to 0, non-cooperation amounts
to a marginal reduction of rent-defending effort, compared to the cooperative
alternative, and this is obviously jointly profitable, irrespective of h .
Once again, if we assume product demand to be linear we find that rent-
defending cooperation is never profitable.
5. Concluding remarks
By including trade unions as independent players in a Tullock model of rent-
seeking, we are able to shed some new light on the rent-seeking theory, as well
as the theory on trade unionism. While traditional theories of trade unions tend
to focus on the conflicting interests of union workers and their employers, the
common interest of firms benefitting from anti-competitive regulation and their
corresponding trade unions becomes very obvious in a context of rent-seeking.
In the present model the monopoly firm and its union have an ex ante common
interest in preserving the monopoly position, whereas ex post the usual conflict
of interests regarding the division of monopoly rents resurfaces. An interesting
feature of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is the fact that the “weaker”
player in the ex post bargaining game is able to take advantage of the common
interest of the rent-defending players in the contest by being a free-rider. Thus,
being “strong”, in terms of relative bargaining strength, need not be an advan-
11 The Stackelberg level of effort is given by
xs =
1
4
(s − h)2
s
Using (12) and (13) it is easily shown that
∂
∂h
((
x∗ + z∗
)
− xs
)
> 0
Rent-seeking in a unionised monopoly 131
tage, in terms of expected net payoff, when a unionised monopoly is facing the
possibility of deregulation.
The model could be extended in numerous ways. An obvious extension would
be to allow for different rent-sharing procedures in the unionised monopoly, e.g.
efficient bargaining. This would not change the nature of the non-cooperative
equilibrium, but it would make some of the other results more clear-cut. For
instance, with efficient bargaining, the presence of a trade union will always
reduce total rent-seeking and increase ex ante social welfare. On the other hand,
rent-defending cooperation could be more profitable.
Finally, another interesting extension would be to introduce some bias in the
contest success function. In the present model, it is implicitly assumed that the
total effect of rent-defending effort is independent of the relative contributions
made by the rent-defending players. It could easily be the case, though, that
the government is more receptive to lobbying by one or the other of the rent-
defending players, and in this case, contest effort made by different players should
be weighted differently in the contest success function.
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We start by proving part (ii) of the proposition. The Lagrangian functions are
given by
Lx =
(
x + z
x + z + y
)
t − x + λx x (A.1)
Lz =
(
x + z
x + z + y
)
r − z + λz z (A.2)
Ly =
(
y
x + z + y
)
(t + r + h) − y + λy y (A.3)
Assume that effort contributions from all players are strictly positive. From the
standard Kuhn-Tucker conditions, this implies λx = λz = λy = 0. Using the
first-order conditions, we have that
x =
√
yt − y − z (A.4)
z =
√
yr − y − x (A.5)
y =
√
(x + z ) (t + r + h) − x − z (A.6)
Now assume that the firm contributes an amount of effort equal to b > 0.
Inserting x = b into (A.5) and (A.6), and solving for z and y , we find the
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optimal responses for the union and the consumer group, respectively, to an
effort contribution x = b by the firm:
z ∗ =
r2 (t + r + h)
(2r + t + h)2 − b (A.7)
y∗ =
r (t + r + h)2
(2r + t + h)2 (A.8)
Inserting z∗ and y∗ into (A.4) yields
x∗ =
b (2r + t + h) + (√r√t − r) (t + r + h)
2r + t + h (A.9)
From (A.9) we see that x∗ = b iff r = t . Thus, in equilibrium there are positive
effort contributions from both the union and the firm only if their valuation of
the prize is identical.
Obviously, y∗ = 0 or x∗ = z ∗ = 0 cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium. This
leaves us with two possible corner solutions:
1) Assume that x∗ = 0, whereas z ∗ > 0 and y∗ > 0. This implies λx ≥ 0
and λz = λy = 0. Using the first-order conditions we find that
λx =
1
r
(r − t) (A.10)
We see that λx ≥ 0 iff r ≥ t . Thus, zero effort by the firm is part of a Nash
equilibrium only if the union values the prize at least as much as the firm.
2) Assume that z ∗ = 0, whereas x∗ > 0 and y∗ > 0. This implies λz ≥ 0
and λx = λy = 0. Again, using the first-order conditions we have that
λz =
1
t
(t − r) (A.11)
From (A.11) it is apparent that λz ≥ 0 iff t ≥ r .
If valuations are equal, i.e. r = t , we know from the first part of the proof
that x∗ = 0 or z ∗ = 0 are parts of only two of a multiplicity of equilibria.
In this case there is a continuum of Nash equilibria in which the firm plays
x∗ = b ∈
[
0, t
2(2t+h)
(3t+h)2
]
and the union plays z ∗ =
(
t2(2t+h)
(3t+h)2 − b
)
.
From (A.10) and (A.11) we see that x∗ = 0 is part of a unique Nash equi-
librium if the union has a strictly higher valuation, i.e. r > t , whereas z ∗ = 0
is part of a unique equilibrium if the firm has a strictly higher valuation of the
prize, i.e. t > r .
Rent-seeking in a unionised monopoly 133
B. Wage bargaining with linear demand
Assuming labour to be the only input factor, the production function is given by
q = l (B.1)
where q is the quantity produced, and l is the amount of labour employed by
the firm. The inverse demand function is given by
p = 1 − q (B.2)
The negotiated wage is given by the outcome of an asymmetric Nash bar-
gaining model, i.e.12
w = arg max
w
[wl (w)]α [(1 − l (w) − w) l (w)]1−α (B.3)
where α is interpreted as the relative bargaining strength of the union. The labour
demand function, l (w), is determined by the firm’s profit maximising behaviour.
With these assumptions, the equilibrium levels of wage and output are easily
calculated:
w =
1
2
α (B.4)
q = l = 1
2
− 1
4
α (B.5)
With the above values of w and q , simple calculation yields
t =
1
16 (2 − α)
2 (B.6)
r =
1
8α (2 − α) (B.7)
h = 132 (2 + α)
2 (B.8)
cs =
1
32 (2 − α)
2 (B.9)
12 For simplicity, the disagreement points are set equal to zero.
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